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Abstract 
This paper may be considered an essay on metaeconomics, since it deals with the 
meaning of several concepts often left undefined, or very briefly defined in economic 
theories. These concepts are the following: value including the values of things and 
moral values, social norms or institutions, social power, goods and services, transactions 
and organizations (firms, and others). 
The paper starts by proposing a general concept of value, encompassing both the 
value of things and moral values. From this concept it proceeds to the definition of six 
different  types  of  values  of  things  and  moral  values  and  to  the  concept  of  value 
transformation  process  of  things  which  includes  all  the  operations  dealt  with  in 
economic theory as well as many other human actions. 
The last part of the paper starts with the distinction between moral values and 
social norms (or institutions) and the roles of social power and human organization in 
connecting the domains of morality and social normativity. The paper proceeds by 
distinguishing  different  types  of  norms,  including  possession  norms  which  are 
important for defining the concepts of goods and services and transaction processes. 
(JEL: A13; Z13). 
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Meta-axiological questions: what is value? 
Objectivism versus subjectivism: is there a third way out? 
In this introductory section with deal with the meta-axiological question of the 
ontological status of values: the values of things and the values of human actions, or 
moral values. This discussion usually jumps between two extreme points: 
- objectivism: values are objective in the sense of existing per se, in things or in 
human actions, independently of human perception about them; 
- subjectivism:  values are subjective creations of human beings, existing per se in 
the minds of their creators.   
If values can exist per se either in objects external to the evaluator, or in the 
mind of the evaluator, how can they be practical, that is, how can they engage the 
action  of  the  evaluator?  To  be  practical,  values  have  to  be  attached  both  to  the 
individual who acts, and to the things on which he acts or to the other individuals with 
whom he interacts. So here we will support the positions of those for whom values 
don’t inhabit neither in an “objective” world existing outside of human lives, nor in a 
purely “subjective” world [MERLEAU-PONTY, 1945].  
Values are embodied mental images 
Values are neither “objective” properties which things or human actions hold per 
se,  independently  of  human  perception  about  them,  nor  are  simply  mental  images 
human beings make about objects in their lives irrespective of the characteristics of 3 
those objects. Values are embodied mental images human beings make about things and 
actions in their lives. 
Embodied means that they don’t exist independently of all the relationships 
(physical, psychological, social) linking the subject with the object of value.   
Values are human creations ex nihilo 
Being embodied mental images does not mean that values are specular reflexes of 
external objects in human minds. They are creations of human beings, but not creations 
in nihilo, or cum nihilo. They are creations ex nihilo, grounded on characteristics of 
things or actions existing independently of those values.  
Values are feelings 
Being embodied mental images, values are generated by some kind of emotion. 
Therefore they are feelings, since they are mental images of emotions [DAMÁSIO, 
1994]. Because they are driven by emotions, values make human beings to desire or to 
reject their objects. So they are motivations for some kind of human action.  
Values are intentional 
Values have a meaning and a reference. They are feelings of someone about 
something  [SCHELER,  1955].  Therefore  they  are  grounded  in  a  simultaneous 
separation [SIMMEL, 1977] and articulation between the subject evaluator and thing or 
action evaluated: we value something we project before us, but which is at our reach, to 
some extent.  4 
Values are about things or about human actions 
Vaues are about things or human actions (actions actually performed, intentions 
to perform certain kinds of actions, or dispositions of character to perform certain 
kinds of actions). In this second case they are what are called "moral values". These 
values have the following characteristics: 
a) they involve sympathy, in the sense that what is valued (own or someone 
else’s  actions,  intentions  or  dispositions  of  character)  always  involve  taking  into 
consideration other people [HUTCHESON, 1971; HUME, 1978; SMITH, 1975].; 
b) they are prescriptive, in the sense of not being expressed as propositions 
which can be true or false, but as imperatives which a human being should follow in his 
actions; 
c)  this  prescriptiveness  has  a  justification  [TUGENDHAT,  1993]  (religious 
beliefs, feelings generated by the human capacity for sympathy, judgements generated 
by human reason) which is or can be made explicit by the moral subject;  
d) prescriptiveness is referred to some kind of bipolarity, in the sense that moral 
values  induce  behaviours  of  affection  or  rejection  with  respect  to  their  objects 
[ANDRÈS, 1994]; 
e)  deviations  of  behaviour  from  this  polar  orientation  generate  an  internal 
sanction for the moral subject (a feeling of guilt); 5 
f) moral values have a certain durability, that is, they remain as self prescribed 
behaviours of a human being for a relatively long period of time [KLUCKHOHNet al., 
1952]; 
g) moral values have some priority over other values the moral subject can give 
to human actions, in the sense of being the superior criterion the person ultimately uses 
for that evaluation [ANDRÈS, 1994]. 
Values are practical 
Values are practical images, in the sense, that they are about some kind of action 
related their objects. More precisely, values can be about six possible dimensions of 
human action: 
a) functionality (what can I do with this?): other objects the subject thinks can 
be done using the valuable object; 
b) exchangeability (what can I get with this?): other objects the subject thinks he 
can get in exchange from the valuable object; 
c) community (with whom can I get along with this?): personal relations the 
subject thinks he can develop using the valuable objects; 
d) communicability (what can I say with this?): information the subject thinks 
he can communicate to others with the valuable objects; 
e) sensibility (what do I feel with this?): feelings the subject experiences with the 
valuable things; 6 
f) identity: objects are valued because they are part of our own identity, or they 
are means to relate us with the sources of our own identity.   
Values are multi-referential 
Evaluation processes can be multi-referential: the same object, at the same point 
in time, can be evaluated in different ways by the same person. This multi-referentiality 
of values increases when we consider the same object evaluated by different human 
beings, and/or in different points in time. 
This multi-referentiality has several implications: 
a) the six types of values are not necessarily mutually exclusive; 
b) multi-referentiality allows for combinations, as well as for conflicts between 
different types of values; 
c)  multi-referentiality  allows  for  transformations  of  one  type  of  value  into 
another. 
Types of values 
Isomorphism between the values of things and moral values 
Since we have defined a general concept of value which can be applied either to 
things, or to features of human actions, it is natural to expect some kind of relationship 
between the types of values people give to things and the different approaches to moral 
values. As we will see in this section, there is an isomorphism  between the types of 
values of things and the main schools of ethical thought. 7 
Use value of things and consequentialist moral values 
Things can be valued because they can be used to make other things. Likewise 
human  actions  can  be  valued  because  they  are  instrumental  to  achieve  some 
consequences. In both cases it is the functional mode of representation of things and 
human actions that is at work. 
One implication of this type of evaluation is that it makes things and human 
actions comparable among themselves: one thing or one action may be better, worse, 
or similar to another one for the purpose of achieving a certain aim. Because of this 
characteristic, use values of things and the consequentialist moral values can be the 
object of preference relations. 
A cornerstone of neoclassical economics is to emphasize this type of value and to 
assume that not only economic agents are able to compare objects of their choice, but 
also that they have preference relations over those objects which are strict weak orders 
(irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive). 
 
 
Exchange value of things and utilitarian moral values 
Things have an exchange value when they are considered as permutable with 
other things. Obviously, exchangeability requires comparability and functionality of 
things to be exchanged, that is, exchange value is included in the class of use value. 
However the comparability that is required here is of a special kind. More precisely, 8 
things to be exchanged have to be made commensurable, that is, that have to be made 
comparable on a common measurement scale. 
Permutability requires further conditions. One is the explicit presence of, at 
least, two human beings in interaction to exchange the permutable objects between 
them.  In  fact,  implicitly  there  are  more  people  involved  in  this  type  of  valuation, 
namely all the potential partners of the two parties [COMMONS, 1974].  
A third condition is the existence of potential mutual advantages for the two 
parties in the exchange: each one should expect to be better off after the exchange. 
A fourth condition is the existence of social norms allowing some freedom of 
negotiation for each party in the exchange.   
The third and the fourth conditions make possible an agreement between the 
two parties in the exchange about the terms of trade. 
A fifth condition is that each party should have reasonable expectations that the 
agreement will be fulfilled. These expectations are grounded on the existence of social 
norms guaranteeing the reciprocity of the exchange relation: trust, social reputation, 
legal and judicial system, etc.   
When the objects of valuation are human actions, exchangeability arises when 
these actions and their consequences on human welfare are made comparable  and 
commensurable on an interpersonal basis. This is the approach taken by utilitarian 
ethics:  it  is  good  to  exchange  the  worsening  of  the  welfare  of  some  for  the 
improvement of the welfare of the others, if these gainers can compensate the loosers.  9 
Informative value of things and discursive moral values  
 Things can be valued because they are the support of information one wants to 
communicate to other human beings: a text someone writes, the words someone utters, 
the uniform a policeman wears, the license plate in a car, the party a rich man gives to 
show off his wealth, etc. We call this the "informative value" of things. 
This  type  of  value  has  one  point  in  common  with  exchange  value:  the 
expectation  of  some  form  of  reciprocity.  It  is  not  material  reciprocity  like  in  the 
exchange of things when one gets one thing in exchange for another. It is symbolic 
reciprocity:  one  sends  a  message  with  a  certain  intended  meaning  and  expects,  in 
exchange, the understanding of that meaning by the receivers. 
Like in the case of the exchange value of things, symbolic reciprocity cannot be 
possible without the existence of some social norms which are common knowledge to 
the parties in the communication process and guaranteeing that it works out. In this 
case they are norms like, for example, the ones that make up the natural languages 
(syntactic, semantic and pragmatic rules). 
From this type of value of things HABERMAS [1983, 1991] has derived an 
ethics for the valuation of human action: the "ethics of discussion". According to 
him the act of communication to be successful, imposes on the parties the respect 
of certain norms: 
- understanding of the utterance; 
- truth of its contents; 
- correction and appropriate nature of its components; 10 
- speaker's sincerity.  
Symbolic exchange value of things and arethologic and deontological moral 
values 
Human beings want to love and to be loved, to like and to be liked, to respect 
and to be respected, to protect and to be protected by other human beings or by some 
superior beings. These are the kinds of personal relationships that contribute to make 
up  a  human  community  [MAUSS,  1923-24;  GODELIER,  1996;  HÉNAFF,  2001] 
Many times human beings build up these kinds of relationships by donating things to 
those beings from whom they expect to get in exchange that love, sympathy, respect or 
protection. This may look like the case defining the exchange value of things, but there 
are important differences: 
- here, even though there are two parties in the transaction, only one is active 
and the other may even not be of this world; 
- the transaction of things donated is not the object of a negotiation between 
the two parties involved to reach an agreement on the terms of the transaction; 
-  what  the  donator  expects  to  get  in  return  is  a  certain  type  of  personal 
relationship with the recipient of his donation which may or may not be fulfilled 
because the transaction is not necessarily accompanied by mechanisms guaranteeing its 
reciprocity. 
  Borrowing an expression coined by BAUDRILLARD [1972, 1976], this will be 
called the "symbolic exchange value" of things. 11 
One particular kind of donation which fits in this type of value is when human 
beings voluntarily contribute to the production of a public good, expecting others to 
do the same. 
The  symbolic  exchange  value  of  things  relies  not  so  much  on  the  physical 
characteristics of the things donated, but on the personal characteristics, or intentions 
of the parties involved. A similar situation arises in the valuation of human actions, 
when  value  is  put  not  so  much  on  the  consequences  of  the  actions,  but  on  the 
dispositions of character, or the intentions of the actors. The first case corresponds to 
the "ethics of virtues", or arethological ethics [ARISTOTE, 1965] and the second case 
to "deontological ethics" [KANT, 1997]. 
Identitary value of things and transcendental moral values 
  Things can be valued because they are considered to be part of the individual’s 
or the community’s identity. In this case they should not be transformed, exchanged, 
donated, or enjoyed as objects of pleasure. They should be kept without any kind of 
transaction, for as long as possible because they are the symbols, or the support of the 
individual’s or the community own life. Often these kinds of things are considered to 
have their origin or to be the means of communication with the divinity, ultimate 
source of life [GODELIER, 1996; HÉNAFF, 2002]. In this case they are sacred objects, 
with a religious meaning. In other cases their nature can be secular, but they may still 
relate to some founding object of the individual or social life, as is the case, for example, 
of the human rights established in the constitutions of democratic states. 12 
This  kind  of  value  of  things,  in  the  field  of  morality,  corresponds  to 
transcendental moral values, namely, theological moral values. In this case, the cognitive 
source of moral values is the “moral conscienciousness” all normal human beings are 
supposed  to  have  and  its  “synderesis”,  that  is,  the  intuitive  capacity  of  human 
conscienciouness for reaching transcendental moral values, as they are revealed to them 
in this way by God [CUNHA, 2001]. 
Aesthetic value of things and subjective moral values 
Things and actions have value essentially because of our feelings of affection or 
rejection about them [HUTCHESON, 1971; HUME, 1978; SMITH, 1975]. Without 
this primary role of feelings there would be no action with respect to things or to other 
human beings. These feelings can be associated with the specific types of intentions 
defining the other types of values, but what is stressed here is their role as primary 
motivation for action. 
Table 1: Types of values of things and moral values 
  Values of things  Moral values 
Functionality  Use value  Consequentialism 
Exchangeability  Exchange value  Utilitarianism 
Community  Symbolic exchange value  Deontologism and ethics of 
virtues 
Communicability  Informative value  Ethics of discussion 
Identity  Identitary value  Transcendental moral values 
Sensibility  Aesthetic value  Subjectivism 
Thingness and value transformation processes of things 
Thingness 13 
Things  are  objects,  consisting  in  particular  forms  of  matter,  energy  and 
information existing in a particular location and time [HEIDEGGER, 1987]. 
Because they are objects, they can exist detached from the existence of a subject 
(or human being).  
Being particular forms of matter, energy and information existing in a particular 
space and time, they may change in their forms, and location in space and time. We call 
these changes “physical transformations of things”. They are presented in the table 
below based on the work of LE MOIGNE [1977]. 
 
 
Table 2: Types of physical transformation processes of things 






















Types of value transformation processes of things 
Since things can become embodied in human lives through the values people 
give to them, besides physical changes, they can also be subject to changes in their 
values which we call “value transformation processes of things”. 
Table 3: Types of value transformation processes of things 
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Given the six types of values presented in the previous section, there are thirty 
six different types of value transformation processes corresponding to all the possible 
combinations of those six types of values of things. The names given to these processes 
are presented in table 3. 15 
Morality, normativity and social equilibration processes 
Morality 
Human actions are not like things. They are not objects holding a relationship 
of exteriority with respect to human beings. They are moments [HUSSERL, 1963] in 
the lives of human beings. This means that they are non detachable parts of those lives. 
This implies that the values human beings give to their actions and, by extension, to the 
actions  of  other  human  beings,  are  also  non  detachable  parts  of  themselves.  They 
cannot  change  those  values  without  changing  their  identities  as  individual  human 
beings. This is the reason why when we deal with moral values we cannot talk about 
value transformation processes in the same way as we deal with changes in the values of 
things. 
Besides this undetachable embodiment of moral values and human lives, moral 
values also have the characteristic of durability: they don’t change as quickly as the 
values of changes. Another specific feature of moral values is their prescritiveness: if the 
subject of these values deviate his behaviour from what is prescribed by his moral values 
he feels an internal sanction.     
 Because if these characteristics, as far as moral values are concerned, what one 
has is consistency or inconsistency of moral values at two levels: 
a)  internal  consistency  or  inconsistency  between  the  individual’s  actual 
behaviours and the moral prescribed by his moral values; 16 
b)  external  consistency  or  inconsistency  between  the  moral  values  of 
interacting human beings. 
Frequent inconsistencies of the first type and of the second type make social 
relationships difficult, possibly chaotic. 
Social normativity 
Social norms (or institutions) like moral values have a certain durability and 
prescritiveness. They arise to equilibrate social relationships against the possibilities of 
frequent inconsistencies of the types presented in the previous sections. In this case the 
positive or negative incentives for prescribed behaviours are external to the individual. 
They are established by the social group where he lives in. So norms are common 
knowledge  for  the  members  of  that  group  and  not  private  knowledge  like  moral 
values. For the same reason norms are exterior to the individuals. This does not mean 
that they are objects like things, since their existence cannot be detached from the 
existence of human beings. What they are detached is from the existence of particular 
human beings. Their attachment is to the existence of the group of human beings 
whose interactions they equilibrate.    
Social power 
Social norms may be the extension to the whole social group of the type of 
prescritiveness corresponding to the moral values of a minority or of the majority of 
the members of the group. These relationships between moral values and social norms 
define the pattern of social power in the society, or within a particular human group: 17 
a)  cooperative  power  if  social  norms  reflect  the  moral  values  of  the  large 
majority of the population or are the result of wide democratic discussions; 
b) domination power if social norms reflect the moral values imposed by a 
minority to the rest of the population. 
 
 
Types of social norms 
Besides the types of relationships they have with respect to the moral values of 
the members of the population, social norms can also be differentiated by the types of 
things and actions they equilibrate. These are not very different from the things and 
actions which values refer to. So we can different the following types of social norms: 
a)  functional norms; 
b)  exchange norms; 
c)  donation norms; 
d)  communication norms; 
e)  identity norms; 
f)  aesthetic norms. 
Possession norms 18 
Concerning  the  norms  referring  to  things,  since  they  constrain  what  the 
members  of  society  can  or  cannot  do  to  each  particular  thing,  they  had  another 
dimension to thins, besides their physical forms, their location in space and time and 
their values. This additional dimension is possession. More precisely, the possession of a 
particular thing is specified at three different and complementary levels: 
a) identity: Does it exist or not a non detachable link between that particular 
thing and a particular individual or social group? 
b) exclusion: Is it possible to impose exclusion mechanisms for the access of 
particular individuals to the use of that thing? 
c)  rivalry:  Does  the  use  of  that  thing  by  an  individual  reduce  the  amount 
available for use by other individuals? 
The first of these three levels is regulated by what was called identity norms. It is 
well known from economic theory, that the other two levels define a typology of goods 
and services with four groups presented in the table below. These groups should be 
considered as polar groups, the real cases lying usually somewhere between these four 
extreme cases. 
Table 4: Types of goods and services based on the degree of exclusion and rivalry 
  Full exclusion  No exclusion 
Full rivalry  Private goods and services  Open access goods and services 
No rivalry  Club goods and services  Pure public goods and services 
 19 
  An expanded typology of goods and services can be established by combining 
the  degree  of  exclusion  and  rivalry  with  the  possibility  of  identitary  features  at 
individual or group level [MENDES, 2003]. 
We can take this typology as a basis for another differentiation of social norms 
which crosses essentially throughout technological, exchange and donation norms. The 
typology is the following: 
a) distributional norms regulating the possession and changes in possession of 
private goods and services; 
b) imputation norms regulating the distribution of private and social costs and 
benefits arising in the production and consumption of open access goods and services; 
c) coordination norms regulating the creation and functioning of social groups 
for the production or consumption of club goods and services (battle of sexes type of 
problems); 
d)  cooperation  norms  regulating  the  individual  contributions  for  the 
production of public goods and services (prisioner’s dilemma typ of problems) 
Identitary,  distributional,  imputation,  coordination  or  cooperation  norms 
defining the possession status of goods and services may take particular forms like the 
following [COMMONS, 1974]: 
a)  liberties or immunities: what may do to a particular thing without being at 
risk of social sanctions; 20 
b)  duties or liabilities: what goods or services one must provide to some other 
people; 
c)  rights or powers: what things an individual or a group can produce or 
consume; 
d)  disabilities  or  exposures:  what things an individual or a group cannot 
produce or consume. 
Transaction processes 
Because norms are external to individuals, they can change without changing 
individual’s identity. In particular the status of possession of a particular thing defined 
by the four types of norms defined above can change without changes in the identity of 
the possessors. Some of these forms of possession on a particular thing can circulate 
among different human beings or social groups. We call this circulation of forms of 
possession of things “transaction processes”. Some types of transaction processes are the 
following: 
a)  market processes; 
b)  contract pocesses; 
c)  donation processes; 
d)  command and control processes; 
e)  persuasion processes.   
Goods and services 21 
We call here “goods” things specified by their physical form (combination of 
matter, energy and information), location in space and time, valuation and statutes of 
possession. We call “services” the acts of human beings or of other beings which change 
things in terms of their form (transformation), their location in space (transportation) 
or  in  time  (conservation),  their  valuation  (value  transformation  process)  or  their 
status of possession (transaction process). 
Social equilibration processes 
To conclude this section we include in the category of “social equilibration 
processes” the six types of social processes defined above: 
a)  social power processes regulating the relationships between moral values 
and social norms; 
b)  creation, functioning and modification of functional, exchange, donation, 
communication,  identity  and  aesthetic  norms,  including  transaction 
processes of forms of possession of about goods and services.      22 
Human organizations 
The concept of human organizattion we are going to propose combines the 
concepts, of human group (or collective), social norms and living being.  
According  to  SCOTT  [1987],  a  colective  is  defined  by  the  following 
characteristics: 
a) it is a bounded network of social relationships; 
b) there is a normative order apllying to all the members of the network. 
Commitment or submission of a particular human group in a particular society 
to a particular system of common social norms which apply specifically to the members 
of that group and not ot the rest of the society, including identity norms defining a 
frontier separating the members from the non members, defines what we call here a 
human organization. Besides identity norms, in the social norms defining the frontiers 
of an organization are also very important social power and functional (what is the 
organization set out to  do with the human and physical resources at its disposal?) 
norms. They define who and how is governed the organisation and for what purposes. 
Obviously possession and communication norms are also part of the system of internal 
norms of the organization. All these norms make up the organization’s culture.      
The  two  characteristics  describe  so  far  are  not  enough  to  define  a  human 
organization. The third important characteristic is that it shares all the features defining 
the concept of life:  
a)  like living beings, organizations have a birth; 23 
b)  they  also  have  a  frontier  separating  their  internal  “milieu”  from  their 
environment; 
c)  they  have  a  “metabolism”  (social  equilibration  processes)  made  of 
interactions in their internal “milieu” and with their environment; 
d)  this  metabolism  is  teleological,  a  major  goals  being  the  organization’s  
survival; 
e)  the structure of the internal “milieu” and meyabolism of the organization is 
subject to evolution in response to changes in the organization’s goals and 
environment; 
f)    during its life or at the end of its life an organization may give birth to 
other  organizations,  of  the  same  kind  or  of  a  different  kind,  through  a 
reproduction process subject to “mutations” and “natural selection”. 24 
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